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I. INTRODUCTION
At no time during our modern experience with the death
penalty have the questions surrounding the wisdom of capital
1
punishment been starker or more troubling. To be sure, the
perennial moral and psychological issues surrounding capital
punishment continue to this day: Is it ever permissible, no matter
how heinous the crime, for the state to take a human life? Does the
death penalty effectively deter the commission of capital offenses?
Or, is the death penalty little more than a primitive blood-letting
exercise that debases any society that administers it?
To these enduring questions have now been added others,
courtesy of remarkable advances in forensic science and DNA
testing that have exposed the troubling inability of prosecutors and
courts to separate consistently the guilty from the actually innocent.
Indeed, we now witness what has become nearly commonplace: the
exoneration by DNA testing of an inmate sentenced to death or life
imprisonment years ago for a capital offense that he did not

† Steven Kaplan is a graduate of Bowdoin College (1968) and the
University of Chicago Law School (1971). He is a shareholder in Fredrikson &
Byron, P.A. and a member of the post-conviction defense team representing
Damon Thibodeaux, a Louisiana death row inmate.
1. Beginning in the late 1970s, a number of states enacted new death
penalty statutes in an effort to comply with the standards that the Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-80 (1972), had found lacking in most
existing death penalty regimes. See Bryan Stevenson, Two Views on the Impact of Ring
v. Arizona on Capital Sentencing: The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The
Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (Summer
2003) (citing MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 42-55 (1999)).
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commit. Science challenges the public’s assumptions regarding
the ability of the judicial system to convict and execute only those
who are in fact guilty. We now know, if we did not before, that
such powerfully incriminating evidence as eyewitness testimony and
the suspect’s own confession may be not merely questionable, but
in fact, demonstrably false.
The courts are now confronting (and the public is gradually
awakening to) the reality that no fact-finding system, however
enhanced it may purport to be with protections for the accused,
can prevent the wrongful conviction of innocent persons,
particularly when, as with capital punishment, the universe of
defendants consists almost exclusively of the poor and poorly
3
represented. In short, science has now weighed in on the moral
2. The Innocence Project at the Cardozo Law School reports that, as of
February 2004, some 142 convicts have been exonerated as a result of DNA testing
since 1989, with seventy-nine of the exonerations occurring since 2000. See
Innocence Project, DNA, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/dna.php
(last visited Mar. 3, 2004). In the first 138 of these exoneration cases, more than
two-thirds of the wrongful convictions, at least in part, involved what proved to be
mistaken eyewitness identifications at trial. See Innocence Project, Case Profiles, at
http://www. innocenceproject.org/case/index.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). Of
the first 123 post-conviction exoneration cases studied, false confessions were
involved in thirty-three of them. Id. The “Central Park Jogger” case itself involved
five defendants, each of whom had falsely confessed to the crimes. False
confessions also led, in part, to suspension of the death penalty in Illinois. Id. See
also Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, State of Illinois (April
2002) available at http://www.idoc.state. il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_
report/summary_recommendations.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). Long
questioned by psychologists, but rarely by courts, the high incidence of false
confessions is attributable to the length and stress of the interrogation, established
police interrogation techniques that are designed to break down the suspect, the
suspect’s low intelligence and/or mental impairment, and the suspect’s desire to
terminate a stressful encounter with interrogators, often accompanied by the
mistaken belief that his innocence will be subsequently proven. See Innocence
Project,
False
Confessions,
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
falseconfessions.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). Minnesota is one of the few states
that require electronic recording of all police interrogations. State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). In contrast, a confession in the vast majority of other
states can be rehearsed by interrogators with the suspect before being written or
recorded, with no record of the hours of interrogation that likely preceded it. See
Innocence Project, False Confessions, at http://www. innocenceproject.org/
causes/falseconfessions.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
3. In recent years, the issue of what constitutes the minimally acceptable
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution has occupied the courts. While initially the adequacy standard was
absurdly low, there is some evidence that the Supreme Court may now be willing
to elevate it in an effort to reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions. Compare
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) with Wiggins v. Smith, ___U.S. ___,
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dilemma of capital punishment with a question of its own: Given
the finality of an execution, can we accept any system that will
inevitably give rise to the judicial system’s worst nightmare—the
conviction and execution of a person who is factually innocent?
As one of twelve states that currently do not have a capital
punishment system, Minnesota has, for the past ninety years,
spared itself the moral challenges and practical costs of
administering the death penalty. Nonetheless, some Minnesota
officials, including Governor Tim Pawlenty, now advocate for the
4
re-institution of the death penalty. In the wake of these calls for
enacting a capital punishment system, Minnesota’s legislators and
citizens would be wise, however, to consider not only the
experience of other states that have practiced capital punishment
for the past twenty-five to thirty years, but also the lessons that
Minnesota learned from its own experiment with the death penalty
between 1849 and 1911.
5
In Legacy of Violence: Lynch Mobs and Executions in Minnesota,
Minneapolis lawyer John D. Bessler sets forth with remarkable
scholarship, clarity, and objectivity the history of Minnesota’s failed
attempt to make peace with capital punishment.
In his
exhaustively researched story of state-sponsored hangings (and of
6
privately administered lynchings as well), Bessler crystallizes the
123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
4. The governor’s initial call for adopting the death penalty came within
hours of the arrest of a Level Three sex offender in connection with the abduction
(and presumed murder) of a college student in December 2003. The governor’s
later proposal contains provisions intended to protect against the conviction of the
innocent, including the prerequisite that DNA evidence “link” the accused to the
crime and that the trial judge must concur with the jury’s imposition of the death
penalty. See Press Release from Governor Pawlenty, Governor Pawlenty Outlines
Principles for Death Penalty Legislation (Jan. 27, 2004), at http://www.governor.
state.mn.us/Tpaw_View_Article. asp?artid=775 (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). In his
January 27, 2004 press release, Governor Pawlenty stated that he supports the
death penalty because “the punishment needs to fit the crime . . . . The death
penalty option will . . . provide closure for families and communities.” Id.
5. JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND EXECUTIONS IN
MINNESOTA (University of Minnesota Press 2003) [hereinafter LEGACY OF
VIOLENCE].
6. Bessler has unmasked the racial hatred in 1920 Duluth that led to the
shocking lynching of three African-American circus workers falsely accused of
raping a white teenage woman. The lynchings, taking place nearly a decade after
the abolition of capital punishment in Minnesota, underscore perhaps the most
grimly ironic of all purported justifications for the death penalty—if the state does
not hang the accused, a lynch mob may do it anyway. Because lynchings are,
mercifully, a part of Minnesota’s past, while the death penalty may become part of
its future, this review centers upon that portion of Legacy of Violence that addresses
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state’s six-decade-long experience with the death penalty and its
struggle, with varying degrees of short-term success, to minimize
the most counter-productive and destructive effects of capital
punishment.
Together with the lessons that can be drawn from the modern
experiences of states currently practicing capital punishment,
Legacy of Violence points us to the fundamental truth underlying the
death penalty—that a punishment, which society first perceives as
necessary to deter crime and vindicate the rule of law, must
ultimately be rejected as counterproductive, costly, and irreducibly
inhumane. In sum, Legacy of Violence and the history of capital
punishment in other states establish that the death penalty itself
carries the seeds of its own demise. That same collective history
also demonstrates, however, that the abolition of the death penalty
is often only a precursor to a later call for its reinstitution as the
lessons learned from prior experience fade and become forgotten.
For these reasons, Legacy of Violence is not only timeless, but also
uniquely relevant in present-day Minnesota as the Legislature
weighs the call for enactment of a sanction that has been absent
from the state’s criminal justice system for more than nine decades.
II. MINNESOTA’S LEGACY OF VIOLENCE
John Bessler’s approach in Legacy of Violence is to tell the story
of Minnesota’s experience with the death penalty (and lynchings)
and to allow his readers to draw their own conclusions regarding
what lessons that history teaches. In doing so, he avoids engaging
in any polemic or tirades, despite the clarity of his own belief that
capital punishment is a self-defeating and misbegotten venture best
left to our less-civilized past. Among the most telling episodes in
Minnesota’s capital punishment history are the following, which
Bessler describes with a trial lawyer’s eye for detail and storytelling
skill.
A. The Dakota Indian Executions
Minnesota’s 1849 territorial charter incorporated mandatory
7
death sentences for any person convicted of a capital offense. By
1854, Minnesota authorities had publicly hanged the Territory’s

the state’s experience with state-sanctioned executions.
7. LEGACY OF VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 1.
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first condemned man, a Dakota Indian, before a large mob in St.
8
Paul that called for the sheriff to “crucify him.” As described in
the Daily Minnesotian, “[l]iquor was openly passed through the
crowd, and the last moments of the poor Indian were disturbed by
9
bacchanalian yells and cries.” A father held his daughter in his
arms so that she could see all, while “giddy, senseless girls and
women chattered gaily with their attendants, and old women were
seen competing with drunken ruffians for a place near the
10
gallows.” According to the account, “the crowd reportedly left the
11
scene ‘satisfied and in high glee.’ ”
After eventually achieving statehood, Minnesota’s support for
capital punishment was most evident in 1862 during the Dakota
12
Conflict, commonly known as the “Sioux Uprising.”
In hastily
arranged and perfunctorily performed “trials” unimpeded by rules
of evidence, defense lawyers, or any definable standard of guilt, a
military commission sentenced more than 300 Dakota Indians to
13
death.
A war-weary President Lincoln, who by then had seen
more than enough Civil War bloodshed, had little tolerance for the
14
carnage that Governor Ramsey then sought to exact.
Nonetheless, Lincoln reluctantly recognized the political need to
appease the calls from Minnesota for revenge and retribution. The
compromise that he crafted between his own sensibilities and those
of the Minnesotans was to commute all but thirty-eight of the death
sentences—a decision that enraged the locals for its leniency. Even
as so “limited,” the hanging of these thirty-eight men in Mankato
15
still remains the largest mass hanging in U.S. history, an event that
16
spectators at the event hailed with a ‘prolonged cheer.’ ”
B. The Execution of a White Woman and the Aborted Effort at
Abolition
While the mass execution of thirty-eight Dakota Indians caused
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at ch. 2.
13. Id. at 44-46.
14. Id. at 47.
15. Even the president could not prevent the Minnesota territorial authorities
from inadvertently hanging an innocent Indian whom they confused with one
whose execution Lincoln had authorized. LEGACY OF VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 62.
16. Id. at 59-62.
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little revulsion in the state, the 1860 hanging of Ann Bilansky, the
only woman executed in Minnesota, caused no shortage of it. The
prosecution alleged that she had poisoned her husband while she
was allegedly engaged in one or more illicit affairs, including one
with her purported “nephew.” To prove its circumstantial case, the
state proffered what, by today’s standards, was absurdly comical
“scientific” evidence designed to prove that the cause of death was
indeed arsenic poisoning. Though the state’s fact witnesses were
hardly more convincing than its “experts” and the evidence that
the deceased had actually taken his own life was at least as strong as
the evidence pointing to his alleged murder, the prosecution
nonetheless obtained a first-degree murder conviction, which the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld. Despite this affirmance,
however, the evidence of guilt was so dubious that the prosecutor
himself later publicly acknowledged his own “grave and serious
17
doubts as to whether the defendant has had a fair trial.”
Although Mrs. Bilansky was a truly unlikable character, the
prospect of executing any woman caused considerable angst,
leading the Minnesota legislature to debate, while Bilansky awaited
her execution, whether capital punishment should be abolished.
In the end, the proponents of the death penalty carried the day,
with the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee setting
forth in its report the following reasons why capital punishment
18
remained necessary:
1. Premeditated murder is distinguishable from all other
crimes and requires a distinctive punishment.
2. The “universal feeling of mankind” is that anyone who
has taken the life of another has forfeited his own.
3. The death penalty is sanctioned by “divine authority.”
4. Abolishing capital punishment would lead to an
increase in crimes of murder.
5. The penal code “almost precludes the possibility of an
innocent person suffering the death penalty.”
6. The abolition of the death penalty would lead to
lynchings (a rather damning justification for capital
punishment, to be sure).
With Mrs. Bilansky’s impending execution thus unimpeded,
the sheriff ordered the construction of a large fence around the
17.
18.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 82-83.
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gallows in the St. Paul courthouse square in an effort to inject a
tasteful measure of “privacy” into the proceedings. Nonetheless,
many onlookers secured vantage points from where they could
witness the hanging, and a crowd estimated at between 1500 and
2000 people gathered outside the fenced enclosure. Following her
hanging, a few attendees claimed pieces of the hangman’s rope as
19
mementos or “a remedy for diseases.”
C. Jury Resistance and Defense Strategies
As initially enacted, Minnesota’s first-degree murder law
automatically required the imposition of the death penalty in the
event of a conviction. Knowing that death would be the necessary
punishment following conviction, jurors faced the dilemma posed
by a defendant who they believed was guilty, but whom they did not
perceive as meriting execution. Sensing the reluctance of jurors to
convict in such cases, the legislature in 1868 amended the law to
make a life sentence the presumptive sentence for a first-degree
murder conviction, with a death sentence to be imposed only if the
20
jury affirmatively voted for it.
Because Minnesota law accorded only a jury the right to
impose the death penalty, some defendants found good reason to
enter guilty pleas to avoid the impaneling of a jury. When,
however, members of the notorious James and Younger gangs used
that tactic to avoid likely death sentences following their infamous
crime sprees in Minnesota, the legislature in 1883 amended the
first-degree murder law in order to grant the trial judge not only
the power to impose capital punishment but the obligation to do so
21
absent “exceptional circumstances.”
D. Protecting the Public From the Gruesome—Smith’s Law
Executions by hanging continued to be openly public affairs
limited only by the individual good taste of the local sheriff called
upon to administer the execution. In such cases, the sheriff might
invite a selected group of guests to serve as onlookers or “assistants”
while attempting to limit the size of the crowd in an effort to
22
minimize the “brutalizing effect” of the hanging upon the public.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 104.
LEGACY OF VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 113.
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By 1889, however, the concern over the unavoidably depressing
impact of the death penalty upon the citizenry gave rise to the
“reforms” incorporated in what became known as “Smith’s Law.”
This statutory effort to protect the public’s psyche from the
negative effects of executions included the following restrictions:
1. All hangings would take place before sunrise while most
people slept.
2. The execution would take place within the walls of the
jail or within an enclosure higher than the gallows.
3. The only persons who could attend the execution were
the sheriff and his “assistants,” the clergy or a priest, a
physician, three persons designated by the condemned
prisoner, and six others designated by the sheriff.
4. The press was forbidden from attending executions and
could not report publicly anything more detailed than the
23
fact that on a particular date the prisoner was executed.
Of course, these press restrictions angered newspapers, which
argued that if the purpose of the death penalty was to deter crime,
the hanging should be a publicly reported affair. In any event,
Smith’s Law’s press restrictions, carrying as they did only a nominal
fine for their violation, did little to deter the press. Consequently,
while hangings continued to be administered with some frequency,
albeit less publicly, an inquisitive citizen could still learn the most
minute details of the hanging simply by reading the account in any
newspaper inclined to disregard the statute.
E. The Abolition Movement Takes Hold—The Hanging of William
Williams
Both public sentiment and Smith’s Law effectively suppressed
large-scale concerns surrounding capital punishment as the state
executed ten more men between 1896 and 1905. Public tolerance
for the death penalty, however, receded following the seminal
event leading to the ultimate abolition of capital punishment—the
unspeakably crude and cruel hanging of William Williams in 1906.
Apparently lacking the requisite mathematical ability to determine
the length of rope appropriate for suspending the condemned
man from the gallows, the sheriff’s crew affixed a length around his
neck that enabled him to land on the floor beneath the scaffolding.

23.

Id. at 118.
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Rather than begin the hanging anew, however, three deputies
pulled on the rope, thereby suspending Williams above the ground
for some fifteen minutes before he was pronounced dead from
strangulation.
News accounts, published in flat violation of the press
restrictions in Smith’s Law, caused widespread revulsion within a
public that had already begun to express its misgivings regarding
capital punishment. Those same news accounts, however, also
resulted in the state prosecuting three St. Paul newspapers for
violating those restrictions. Arguing that the law beneficially
precluded the publication of execution details that would appeal to
morbid tastes and lowered public morals, the state convinced the
Minnesota Supreme Court that the restraint on the press was
necessary and constitutional.
Ultimately, however, the press reporting of the Williams
hanging coalesced abolitionist forces that viewed the death penalty
as not only immoral and dehumanizing but also as
24
counterproductive to its avowed purpose of deterring crime. By
1911, proponents of abolishing the death penalty gathered a
majority in the legislature to end the practice, convinced that (a)
capital punishment was not a deterrent, (b) juror reluctance to
impose the death penalty had likely led to the acquittal of
defendants who would have been otherwise convicted, (c) the
death penalty ran counter to the purpose of reforming and
correcting prisoners, (d) it brutalized society, and (e) it foreclosed
the subsequent exoneration of anyone who might later be proven
25
innocent. In place of a presumptive death penalty, Minnesota’s
first-degree murder statute was reformed to provide a mandatory
life sentence in all cases. Realizing the limitations of the eye-for-aneye philosophy underlying the death penalty, Minnesota joined the
movement in the early twentieth century toward a less violent,
demoralizing, error-prone, and costly way of punishing its worst
offenders.
III. THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY
While many other states that had previously abolished the
death penalty later re-established it after World War II, Minnesota
has refrained, along with eleven other states, from returning to a
24.
25.

Id. at 173-79.
Id. at 173-179.
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capital punishment system that it found so troubling. Since 1911,
Minnesota has consistently rejected the death penalty while at the
same time it has also retained one of the lowest murder rates in the
nation, a characteristic common to most of the states that also
26
currently abstain from capital punishment.
In the past three decades following the Supreme Court’s
27
decision in Furman v. Georgia, the modern practice of capital
punishment in the thirty-eight states that embrace it has spawned
increasing litigation and public controversy over the manner in
28
which capital punishment is administered. At present, there are
29
some 3500 inmates on death row in the United States, nearly all of
whom were unable to retain their own private counsel at trial and
who were frequently represented, often inadequately, by an
overworked and underfunded public defender or by an unskilled
30
and underfunded court-appointed private lawyer.
Even as they contest their death sentences in post-conviction
proceedings, many of the condemned remain unrepresented.
Many of those who are forced to represent themselves are impaired
31
either intellectually or psychologically.
Were it not for the
enormous pro bono commitment of time and money expended by
members of the private bar, many of whom practice in non-death
32
penalty states including Minnesota, the number of death row
inmates without legal representation would be markedly higher.
In recent years, along with scientific proof that courts and
juries frequently err in administering capital punishment, the sheer
26. Id. at XVII.
27. 408 U.S. 273 (1972).
28. Facts About the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004)
(showing statistics for states and increasing public concern).
29. Id.
30. See Death Penalty Representation, Death Penalty Information Center,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=896&scid=68 (last
visited Mar. 3, 2004); Amanda Paulson & Abraham McLaughin, Despite Reprieves,
3,500 Still on Death Row in the U.S., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 4, 2003,
available at http://www.christiansciencemonitor.com/2003/0904/p04s01-usju.htm
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
31. See Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=78&scid=66 (last
visited Mar. 3, 2004); Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty
Information Center, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.
php?scid=28&did=176 (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
32. At present, at least ten death row inmates in other states currently have
Minnesota private practitioners representing them in post-conviction relief
proceedings.
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volume of executions and death penalty sentences has forced the
courts and the public at large to re-examine the wisdom of
attempting to administer any system of capital punishment. No
doubt, the advancements in forensic and DNA testing have
heightened the courts’ awareness that, given its finality and severity,
33
“death is qualitatively different” and requires a heightened
concern for how the condemned have actually arrived on death
row. In terms of jurisprudence, the courts have unavoidably
confronted the glaring shortcomings in the system including not
only those resulting from breathtakingly inept representation at
trial and the denial of such basic constitutional protections as the
34
35
right to indictment by a grand jury and to trial by jury but also
from the insistence of several states upon executing the mentally
36
37
retarded and juveniles.
The call in Minnesota for re-establishment of capital
punishment ironically comes, therefore, at a time when doubts
regarding the wisdom of accepting the costs, burdens, and
imperfections of capital punishment have never been greater and
courts have been forced to scrutinize the legitimacy and reliability
of death penalty convictions. The issue now for Minnesota is
whether any system that it might adopt could be administered in a
38
manner consistent with its own moral sense and best interests.
As John Bessler has shown us, Minnesota, once an unrelenting
practitioner of capital punishment, has already answered that
33. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated by 535
U.S. 953, remanded, 357 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2004) ; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243, n.6 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002); Almendarez-Torres v. United States., 523 U.S. 224 (1998);
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, ___ U.S.
___, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
37. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___,
124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004).
38. For example, would trial judges and jurors in Minnesota be sufficiently
open to imposition of a death sentence in capital cases such that the system could
function in the majority of courtrooms in the state? Would the public defenders’
offices in Minnesota have the time and resources necessary to defend not only the
guilt phase, but also the penalty phase of a capital case, as well as the numerous
direct and post-conviction appeals that follow in the event of a conviction and
imposition of the death penalty in a given case? How will the standards for
determining what types of crimes and the manner of their commission be
expressed and applied so that the death penalty would be imposed with a
semblance of consistency and rationality?
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question with a profound “no.” As the state considers whether any
modernized and “improved” system of capital punishment could
satisfy Minnesota’s standards of morality and justice, its leaders
would do well not only to study John Bessler’s work in depth but
also to heed the words with which he prefaces it:
The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a
descending spiral, begetting the very thing that it seeks to
destroy . . . . Returning violence for violence multiplies
violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already
devoid of stars.
39
—Martin Luther King, Jr.

39. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? CHAOS
COMMUNITY 62 (Beacon Press paperback ed. 1967).
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